Copyright 2000 Federal News Service, Inc.
Federal News Service
May 23, 2000, Tuesday 

LENGTH: 17504 words 

HEADLINE: HEARING OF THE SENATE ARMED SERVICE COMMITTEE 
SUBJECT: U.S. STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCE REQUIREMENTS
CHAIRED BY: SENATOR JOHN WARNER (R-VA)
WITNESSES: WALTER SLOCOMBE, DEFENSE UNDERSECRETARY FOR POLICY; 
GEN. HENRY SHELTON, CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF; GEN. HENRY 
SHINSEKI, ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF; ADM. JAY JOHNSON, CHIEF OF NAVAL 
OPERATIONS; GEN. JAMES JONES JR., MARINE CORPS COMMANDANT; GEN. 
MICHAEL RYAN, AIR FORCE CHIEF OF STAFF, AND ADM. RICHARD MIES, 
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND
LOCATION: 106 DIRKSEN SENATE OFFICE BUILDING, WASHINGTON, D.C.
TIME: 9:32 A.M. EDT DATE: TUESDAY, MAY 23, 2000 

BODY:      SEN. WARNER: (Gavel.) Committee will come to order. The committee meets 
today to receive testimony on the United States Strategic Nuclear Requirements. The Senate, 
which has the advice and consent responsibility under the Constitution, must remain well- 
informed on all issues relating to treaties, those in force as well as those being contemplated. 

This committee, together with others, have a special role to play, a special responsibility 
regarding the international commitments that relate to our nation's national security. 

The ongoing debate regarding the administration's negotiating position on START III is largely 
about U.S. nuclear requirements. Hence today's hearing will involve matters related to the 
military implications of a prospective START III treaty. 

Recent press reports have described the debate that is taking place in the administration in 
preparation for the president's summit meeting in Moscow early in June. This debate should take 
place. It is a vital part of our process and the long-term survival of our nation, and indeed that of 
our allies. 

The Senate, through this hearing, is participating in that debate. And I want to make it very clear, 
I wish the president well, and I say that with great sincerity. This is an important summit. I hope, 
as a consequence of the meetings, that the message that will be forthcoming at the conclusion is a 
positive one, not only for the United States and Russia, but indeed for the world. I look upon this 
summit as a building block laying a foundation for the next president of the United States to 
build on, especially in the area of arms control. 

But I say with respect to the president and all those concerned that Congress, especially the 
United States Senate, has a role with regard to treaties. Let me emphasize that any international 
agreement limiting U.S. armed forces or armaments must be entered into only pursuant to the 
treaty-making powers set forth in the Constitution. 

The administration has attempted often to circumvent the Senate in a range of arms control 
agreements. It did so regarding the so- called ABM Treaty demarcation agreement until the 
Senate blocked entry into force of the CFE flank agreement, until the president certified that the 
demarcation agreement would be submitted to the Senate for advice and consent. 

I call your attention to the Arms Control and Disarmament Act of 1961. It makes the president's 
obligations very clear in law. And I quote: "No action shall be taken pursuant to this chapter or 
any other act that would obligate the United States to reduce or limit the armed forces or 
armaments of the United States in a militarily significant manner except pursuant to treaty-
making power of the president set forth in Article 2, Section 2, Clause 2 of the Constitution or 
unless authorized by the enactment of further affirmative legislation by the Congress of the 
United States," end quote. 

Every arms control treaty resolution or ratification that has come before the Senate since 1989 
has included a declaration that any international agreement that limits U.S. armed forces or 
armaments may only be entered into pursuant to the president's treaty-making power under the 
Constitution. 

Now, I've had the privilege, in my modest career, to be involved in this subject for some time. 
Twenty-eight years ago this month, I was part of the delegation of the president of the United 
States, Richard Nixon, when we went to Moscow. My specific duties at that time related to the 
completing of the incidence-at-sea agreement. But the day after that agreement was signed, they 
entered into the initial arms control agreements with then-President Brezhnev, and more 
specifically the ABM Treaty. I remember it very well. 

And I make these observations. Now that the Cold War has ended, should we have put an end to 
the strategic theory called mutual assured destruction, which holds that for deterrence to be 
effective, the United States and Russia need to leave themselves completely vulnerable to 
massive nuclear attack. 

Even during the Cold War, the notion that defense would undermine deterrence was 
questionable. Today such a notion is, I think, long overdue for review. Unfortunately, in my 
judgment, the Clinton administration has failed in any significant way to move the United States 
away from the lingering effects of mutual assured destruction. The administration continues to 
characterize the ABM Treaty as, quote, "the cornerstone of strategic stability," end quote, even 
though it is clear that the treaty fundamentally prevents the United States from confronting new 
post-Cold War threats. 

Twenty-eight years ago, when we were there in Moscow, with the best of intentions, we never 
foresaw the capabilities of other nations, and we all know which they are today; more 
specifically, North Korea, Iran, possibly someday Iraq; and indeed, the question mark always 
lingers over China. We did not foresee at that time these threats poised at our nation. 

So I think I've made enough comment on that, and I do that with respect to our president and all 
those engaged. An important issue in this debate is whether or not the U.S. should accept 
strategic reductions below those tentatively agreed by the president, President Clinton and 
President Yeltsin in the March '97 at Helsinki. At Helsinki, the United States and Russia 
committed to negotiate a START III treaty that limits the size to between 2,000 and 2,500 
strategic warheads. 

Recently, Russia has made it clear its preference for deeper cuts to approximately 1,500 
warheads per side. I question, what is the depth of concern regarding the possibility that our 
negotiators would agree to a START III treaty that limits us to 2,000 or 1,500 deployed strategic 
warheads? Some believe that such deep cuts would undermine our deterrence posture or result in 
a less flexible and stabilizing force. Today's hearings will raise those issues and give our 
distinguished panel an opportunity to answer. 

Of the many important issues to be addressed today, I believe that the following questions are 
critical. What is the military significance of designing the U.S. strategic force posture around the 
START III treaty based on the Helsinki framework? And how does this change, if the U.S. is 
required to reduce to 2,000 or 1,5000 warheads deployed, how does that change it? 

How will reduced force levels under a START III treaty affect our ability to maintain a viable 
and stabilizing triad of strategic nuclear delivery systems? What changes in counting rules does 
the United States require under START III to ensure that low nuclear limits do not force the U.S. 
to give up conventional weapons platforms? What are the military implications of the disparity in 
tactical nuclear weapons between the United States and Russia under a START III regime? 

What are START III's implications for our ability to deter the use of chemical, biological or 
nuclear weapons in regional conflicts while maintaining strategic stability among the major 
nuclear powers? Will the low force levels being considered for START III encourage countries 
other than Russia to seek nuclear peer status with the United States? Should the Senate be 
concerned that the United States may be pressing ahead towards a START III agreement without 
having conducted a recent comprehensive review of our strategic nuclear policy doctrine and 
requirements? 

In the markup of this committee just two weeks ago for the Fiscal Year 2001 defense 
authorization bill, this committee adopted a provision that would require the conduct of such a 
review. Moreover, this provision, which was adopted unanimously by the committee, expresses 
the sense of the Congress, and I quote, "that such review should be used as the basis for 
establishing future United States arms control objectives and negotiating positions," end quote. 

It is vitally important for the Senate and the people of this great nation to understand the military 
significance of the various options that are being considered for any prospective START III 
treaty. I'm well aware that the answers to many of these questions that I have posed and that 
other members will ask will involve classified and sensitive information. Therefore, we will have 
a closed session immediately following this open hearing. 

I urge the witnesses to be as forthcoming as possible in the open, but I respect their judgment 
regarding answers that need to be reserved for a closed session. I particularly want to thank the 
chairman, General Shelton, for calling me with regard to this subject, and I've made the 
arrangements that you requested accordingly. I urge senators to respect the importance of the 
closed session and the essential requirement to make no public disclosure of proceedings that 
take place in this closed session. 

As a citizen of this great nation, I respect the constitutional duties of our president to conduct the 
foreign affairs of our nation. Summit meetings are an important of this president and all 
presidents' responsibilities. But Congress, especially the United States Senate, has a role, a very 
balanced role, under our Constitution to play. 

I welcome our distinguished witnesses. We will receive testimony from the honorable Walter 
Slocombe, undersecretary of Defense for policy; General Henry Shelton, chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff; General Shinseki, chief of staff of the Army; Admiral Jay Johnson, chief of naval 
operations; General Jones, commandant of the Marine Corps; and General Michael Ryan, chief 
of staff of the United States Air Force. We also are pleased to include Admiral Mies, 
commander-in- chief, United States Strategic Command. 

Senator Levin. 

SEN. CARL LEVIN (D-MI): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I join you in welcoming all of our 
witnesses this morning. It's a very significant subject and it's very worthy of congressional 
discussion and deliberation. I would hope that as our president approaches the summit that the 
Senate's advice or senators' advice would be constructive. Going up to this summit, it seems to 
me, constructive advice, if there is a treaty that ultimately results from this summit or later on 
down the road -- we will surely have adequate time to consider any such treaty. But in advance 
of the summit, I think it is important that the Senate act as constructively as possible for this or 
any other president facing such a summit. 

The number of nuclear weapons that are needed to deter are not produced by the Pentagon out of 
thin air. They're determined presumably in response to guidance that is the result of a policy 
decision. In making their recommendations, the Pentagon is responding to policy goals that have 
been determined by the civilian leadership. 

The president decided in the presidential decision directive that the principal policy of the United 
States is to deter. Deterrence is the key. How many weapons are needed to deter an adversary? 
Well, to be effective, the adversary has to believe that the U.S. can and will deliver the nuclear 
weapons. 

But one of the most difficult questions here, at least for me, has been to separate what are the 
appropriate questions for the civilian leaders and what are the appropriate questions for our 
military leaders to decide. The determination of what is adequate deterrence, in my judgment, is 
a policy decision for the civilians. Will we need 1,000 weapons with the power of 50,000 
Hiroshima weapons to deter? 

The policymakers should decide what is necessary to deter a rational leader of another country. 
What another nation values most in other words, what types of targets need to be destroyed in 
order to deter, in my judgment, is fundamentally a policy question, with the exception of military 
targets, which the other country might value most, which seems to me a judgment which our 
military should be basically making. 

What number or percentage of targets need to be destroyed to deter effectively, it seems to me, is 
basically a policy decision. What number of nuclear weapons is necessary to destroy those 
numbers and types of targets, it seems to me, is basically a military question. 

But unless we sort of analyze for ourselves -- and each one may reach a different conclusion on 
that -- as to what is the civilian responsibility and what is the military responsibility, it seems to 
me that we will be talking about numbers in the abstract. We've heard that the Pentagon says that 
we need, for instance, 2,000 or 2,500 nuclear weapons to deter. The ultimate number of 
weapons, it seems to me, is driven not by the Pentagon but by a policy decision by our civilian 
leaders as to what a rational leader in another country would cause that leader to refrain from 
attacking our country. 

And that is essentially a decision, what is necessary to deter, which I believe is a civilian 
decision, and so that when we read and hear that the Pentagon says that a certain number of 
weapons is needed to deter, I hope that our representatives here, from the Pentagon, both civilian 
and military, will tell us more precisely what is meant by that statement. Is that a statement made 
by military leaders, or is that a statement which they conclude is necessary in order to carry out 
the civilian guidance which they have received, and if so, what has that guidance been? 

So, we have a number of questions facing us this morning. How does the U.S. military respond 
to the policy guidance, put in place a force structure to meet that guidance? And what strategic 
forces does the United States need to meet the policy guidance and maintain a strong deterrent? 
And many other concerns, including whether or not our policy is launch on warning, whether we 
want to be reliant on launch on warning, what are the counting rules, and questions such as that, 
which go into the ultimate question of what is needed to deter. 

So there are many questions that we need to address this morning, some very fundamental 
questions, questions which really have not been looked at for many, many years by the Congress, 
and I think it's very constructive, hopefully, that we look at them now so that we can see whether 
or not, as we move out of the Cold War era, we can realistically now look at the guidance, see 
whether or not it is still relevant to the current world, and if changes are appropriate, what that 
means in terms of the structure of our nuclear forces. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

SEN. WARNER: Thank you very much, Senator Levin. We'll press right on with the hearing. 
Last week I endeavored to have this hearing, and it was abruptly cut off by an arcane Senate rule 
that says no committees can meet, and so forth, but we're gonna press right on. 

Secretary Slocombe, we'll start off with you, followed by General Shelton, and then our 
distinguished panel of chiefs. 

MR. SLOCOMBE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin, members of the committee. It is, 
as always, an honor to represent the secretary of defense before this committee today, on this 
occasion to discuss an issue which is of great importance to the security of this country and the 
peace of the world: the role of our nuclear forces in U.S. defense policy and the implications of 
possible future agreed reductions and limitations of those forces. 

As you suggested in your opening statement, Mr. Chairman, for reasons that are I think plain to 
this committee, there are very sharp limits on what it is prudent to say publicly about U.S. 
nuclear plans under any circumstances, and about U.S. negotiating position while they are still 
being formulated for ongoing talks, including at the summit level. 

However, there are certain principles that are basic and that are public that guide us on both these 
issues. The strategic policy for our nuclear forces, including plans for their employment, is set 
forth by the president of the United States. Detailed guidance to implement his broad national 
strategy, as established by the president, is issued from time to time by the secretary of defense, 
and in still greater detail on a biannual basis by the joint chiefs of staff. On the basis of this 
guidance, the United States Strategic Command annually develops a detailed operational plan for 
the employment of our strategic forces. 

While the risk of large-scale nuclear war is now very low, our nuclear forces continue to serve as 
an important hedge against an uncertain future. They are also a guarantee of our security 
commitment to our allies, and a disincentive to those who would contemplate developing, 
acquiring or using their own nuclear weapons. 

The current policy of the United States with respect to the employment of our nuclear arsenal 
was set forth in a presidential directive in the autumn of 1997. That policy incorporates long- 
standing principles adhered to by successive administrations since at least the 1970s. Under the 
current directive, as in the past, U.S. military planning for strategic nuclear weapons and their 
employment is focused on deterring a nuclear war, and it emphasizes the survivability of our 
nuclear systems and the infrastructure necessary to endure preemptive attack and still respond in 
overwhelming levels. Our overall nuclear employment policy according states -- the United 
States forces must be capable of and be seen to be capable of holding at risks those critical assets 
and capabilities that a potential adversary most values. Additionally, our nuclear weapons must 
have the capability and survivability to be executed effectively under all conditions of warning 
and alert, ranging from a surprise no-notice attack, to an attack carried out after full force 
generation, including cases where we ride out an attack. 

The United States is and has long been committed to appropriate and jointly agreed upon 
reductions in our strategic nuclear forces, both because such reductions can enhance our security, 
and because progress on reducing the U.S. and Russian arsenals helps to build sound relations 
with Russia and maintain international support for our nonproliferation efforts. In seeking to 
move toward a START III treaty with Russia in the context of an amendment to the AMB 
Treaty, the administration has continued the effort, which has been carried on by every 
administration since at least that of President Johnson, to stop the growth of nuclear dangers and 
to seek significant, gradual, verifiable, and stabilizing reductions in strategic nuclear forces 
consistent with maintaining the nation's security. 

The administration's proposals for START III follow the agreement made at Helsinki in March 
1997 which outline the major elements for a future treaty. The United States' agreements on 
force levels and the other elements agreed at Helsinki were supported by the chairman of the 
joint chiefs of staff and the STRATCOM commander-in-chief at the time. At Helsinki, as the 
committee knows, the presidents agreed that START III would establish the ceiling for the 
United States and Russia to be reached by the end of 2007, with 2,000 to 2,500 deployed 
strategic nuclear warheads. That level will be 30 to 45 percent below that permitted by START 
II, and approximately two-thirds below what is permitted by START I. Although the Russians 
have proposed lower levels, it remains the U.S. position that START III should reflect the 
Helsinki agreement on levels. 

In an important new development promoting the irreversibility of deep reductions, the presidents 
also agreed in Helsinki that both sides would seek agreement on transparency into strategic 
nuclear warhead stockpiles, and for some monitored elimination of strategic nuclear weapons 
that were not in a deployed status. They also agreed that the United States and Russia would 
explore possible measures regarding limitations on tactical nuclear system. And as I mentioned 
before, they also -- they have agreed subsequently in Cologne that there will be discussions on 
the possibility of modifying the ABM Treaty, in the U.S. view, to permit a limited defense 
against the rogue state threat. 

The United States does not seek reductions for their own sake. For the Department of Defense 
and for the administration as a whole, the standard of what reductions or other proposed arms 
control measures are acceptable will continue whether they are compatible with maintaining 
nuclear deterrence in line with the policy I have summarized. The Department of Defense, 
including the joint chiefs of staff and the commander-in-chief of strategic command, was fully 
consulted in connection with the agreement in Helsinki in 1997 on the 2,000 to 2,500 level. Any 
consideration of proposals for different levels would be subject to the same process. 

I would be happy to discuss all these issues in more detail during the closed session, which I 
appreciate the committee's understanding the requirement for it. 

That concludes my statement. 

SEN. WARNER: Thank you very, Secretary Slocombe. General Shelton. 

GEN. SHELTON: Well, thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, other distinguished members of 
the Senate, it's a great pleasure to be in front of you again this morning and have the opportunity 
to testify regarding this very significant issue. 

Let me also up front thank the Congress and especially the members of this committee for your 
sustained and significant support of our armed forces, as evidenced by the great work that you 
did on the FY 2001 Authorization Act. 

Today, the joint chiefs welcome the chance to give our assessment of America's current and 
future strategic nuclear force requirements, and how that affects the negotiating framework for 
possible future START III negotiations with Russia. As mentioned earlier, in addition to my 
testimony, the commander-in-chief, U.S. Strategic Command, Admiral Mies, would like to make 
a brief opening statement, after which all of us will be prepared to take your questions. 

Although, as the chairman mentioned up front, or cautioned up front, there's very little that we 
can talk about in specifics in an open session. In your invitation for your hearing, Mr. Chairman, 
you and Senator Levin asked the joint chiefs to provide our assessment of the potential impact of 
a new START III agreement on the ability of our armed forces to ensure the national security of 
the United States. As you're aware, this is a national security issue of the very highest order. And 
as you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, a summit is scheduled next month between President Clinton 
and President Putin in Moscow, and it's expected that possible START III talks will be on the list 
of topics to be discussed. We're also aware of the recently publicly stated Russian interest in 
going beyond the numbers suggested at the Helsinki summit in March of 1997. 

First, let me say that we are pleased to see the Russian Duma ratify START II. Pending Senate 
concurrence and ratification of the START II agreement, we are prepared to reduce the number 
of our strategic warheads from the START I limit of 6,000 to the START II limit of 3,500. Let 
me also add that the chiefs favor additional negotiated reduction in the nuclear arsenals of Russia 
and the United States. We were fully consulted before the summit in Helsinki, and have 
supported the START III negotiating framework that seeks to reduce the number of strategic 
warheads to the 2,000 to 2,500 range. As I said, the chiefs support further strategic arms 
reductions, and the START III framework adopted at Helsinki. However, there are concerns that 
must be addressed. 

As stated, Mr. Chairman, as you mentioned yourself, it's difficult to go into detail in an open 
session, but in general, we have considered additional reductions in our nuclear arsenal, and have 
an ongoing analysis of the previously agreed to framework for START III. And while the joint 
chiefs would welcome the opportunity to reduce the levels of nuclear arms, our concern first and 
foremost is always the United States military ability to safeguard and enhance the security of the 
United States. 

Thus, from a military perspective, several challenges must be addressed with any new proposals 
for a lower warhead ceiling. First, we must consider the impact that lowering the bracket might 
have on our current conventional force structure. As you know, some of our strategic platforms 
have very important conventional deterrents and operational roles as well. We must maintain our 
ability to effectively continue the current mix of delivery platforms in the nuclear triad. 
Secondly, we must be able to execute our national strategic nuclear plan in the event that this 
were to become necessary. Mr. Chairman, it's also important to recall that the START 
framework only requires the destruction of strategic weapon launches and delivery vehicles, not 
the warheads themselves. 

Finally, there are other pertinent factors, some of which you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, that 
should be considered as we examine the appropriate warhead levels, such as whether or not 
proposed levels lead to greater stability, our nuclear stockpile reliability, the tactical and nuclear 
weapons imbalance that exists, the worldwide weapons of mass destruction proliferation, and the 
multinational aspects of nuclear development. 

Mr. Chairman, we again, we appreciate the opportunity to meet with the committee today and to 
share our views with you. And we look forward to amplifying our comments and more fully 
addressing your concerns either here or in the closed session, as appropriate. 

At this time, I would like to give Admiral Mies the opportunity to present his opening statement. 
Thank you. 

SEN. WARNER: Admiral Mies. 

ADMIRAL RICHARD MIES: Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin, distinguished senators, I really 
appreciate the opportunity to also be here before your committee this morning. Before I begin, 
I'd also like to thank you, each of you, for your sustained support to the Department of Defense 
to our strategic deterrent forces and also for your continued commitment to a safe, reliable and 
secure nuclear weapons stockpile through the Department of Energy's Stockpile Stewardship 
Program. 

SEN. WARNER: I wish to thank you, Admiral, for making time available here on Capitol Hill to 
brief individually and collectively the members of this committee. It was that briefing that 
prompted me to explore the possibility of having this hearing as early as possible. I wish to thank 
you. 

ADM. MIES: Yes sir. 

Deterrence of aggression and coercion is a cornerstone of our national security strategy, and our 
strategic nuclear forces serve as the most visible and most important element of our commitment 
to this principle. These forces represent our nation's ultimate insurance policy. Nuclear weapons 
help keep the Cold War cold. And although the risk of massive nuclear attack has decreased 
significantly and the role of nuclear weapons in this post-Cold War environment has changed 
dramatically, deterrence of major military attack on the United States and its allies, particularly 
attacks involving weapons of mass destruction, still remains our highest defense priority. The 
president has affirmed that nuclear weapons serve as a hedge against an uncertain future, a 
guarantee of our security commitment to our allies, and a disincentive to all those who would 
contemplate developing or otherwise acquiring their own nuclear weapons. And although the 
Cold War has ended, there still remain a number of potentially serious threats to our national 
security, including regional dangers, asymmetric challenges, transnational threats and wild cards. 
Cooperative threat reduction, arms control, presidential initiatives, and numerous confidence-
building measures have brought about many positive changes in the strategic posture of both the 
United States and Russia, and I think these changes reflect a new, more stable, and constructive 
relationship. 

We are pleased that Russia has ratified START II, and if the conditions they have attached to that 
ratification are deemed acceptable and START II enters into force, we are prepared to move to a 
START II compliant force in a deliberate, prudent manner. That force will be a credible, robust 
deterrent, with sufficient flexibility to respond to future challenges. It provides a cushion against 
imperfect intelligence and surprises, and it preserves a reconstitution capability as a hedge 
against unwelcome political or strategic developments. And as the chairman has indicated, the 
joint chiefs of staff and U.S. Strategic Command have supported the principles of the Helsinki 
framework to further enhance our national security and reduce the risk of war. 

However, as the chairman has also indicated, that does not mean that all our concerns with the 
details of that framework have been completely satisfied. The strategic environment has also 
changed since Helsinki. Today, I think we have a much better appreciation of the risks and the 
concerns associated with further reductions than we had two years ago. As one example, we are 
much more aware of the potential that START attribution and counting rules may have on our 
conventional bomber capability than we did prior to the Helsinki Accord. 

As a second example, Russia has placed increased reliance on their nuclear weapons 
employment in their declaratory policies, and recent statements by senior Chinese officials also 
may point towards an increased role for nuclear weapons in their foreign policy. 

The chairman has already mentioned a number of factors that must be considered as we evaluate 
further arms control reductions. As I have previously testified, I believe that further reductions in 
strategic delivery systems beyond START II need to be complemented by a more comprehensive 
consideration, considerations of increased stockpile transparency, including greater 
accountability and transparency of non-strategic of tactical nuclear warheads; limitations on 
nuclear weapons production infrastructures; the relationship of third-party nuclear weapon 
stockpiles; the impact on our extended deterrence security commitments to our allies; and the 
implications of deploying strategic defensive systems. 

For understandable reasons, there is little I can say publicly about the details of these 
considerations because of the security classifications associated with our security forces, and I 
would be happy to discuss these issues in more detail during the closed session. Additionally, 
there are some issues I am naturally reluctant to discuss while our Department of Defense policy 
is still in formulation. 

As we proceed to lower numbers, stability, the assurance against being caught by surprise, the 
safety in waiting, rather than numerical parity, is the most important criteria in assessing 
prospective arms control measures. As Albert Walstader (sp) wrote many years ago, "Relaxation 
of tensions, which everyone thinks is good, is not easily distinguished from relaxing one's guard, 
which everyone thinks is bad." 

As we reduce our strategic delivery systems to lower levels, parity in numbers alone becomes 
less and less important. Issues such as transparency, irreversibility, production capacity, 
aggregate warhead inventories and verifiability become more and more significant. It is 
ultimately the character and the posture of our strategic forces, characteristics like weapon 
system reliabilities, characteristics and posture more than the numbers, that makes the strategic 
environment stable or unstable. 

Additionally, because we have neither new delivery platforms nor new warheads in 
development, we must not be hasty in taking irreversible steps to reduce our capability or 
flexibility. Deterrence ultimately depends not on our capability to strike first but on the assurance 
that we always have a capability to strike second. 

I believe the emerging debate about further reductions in our nuclear forces is timely and should 
be guided by two fundamental principles which have been articulated by both a former national 
security adviser and a former special assistant to the president on arms control. First, we should 
continue to focus on arms control measures which directly and demonstrably enhance stability 
and reduce the risks of war. Second, given the clear risks and the elusive benefits inherent in 
additional deep cuts, the burden of proof should be on those who advocate such reductions to 
demonstrate exactly how and why such cuts would serve to enhance our national security. 

Strategic deterrence will be a fundamental pillar of our national security for the foreseeable 
future. An early strategist's metaphor that nuclear planners are like home builders remains true 
today. A wise architect doesn't design only for the benign environments but for the worst 
weather conditions that one can reasonably anticipate -- hurricanes, earthquakes, floods and the 
like. 

And I think, in the nuclear world, we have consistently maintained a building code for our 
nuclear forces to ensure they can weather the most stressed environments. And as we look to 
further reductions, we need to maintain our strategic deterrent force structure with that wise 
architect's prudent design criteria in mind. Our force structure needs to be robust, flexible and 
credible enough to meet the worst threats we can reasonably postulate. Our nation must always 
maintain the ability to convince potential aggressors to choose peace rather than war, restraint 
rather than escalation, and termination rather than conflict continuation. 

Thank you very much. 

SEN. WARNER: Admiral, again, I wish to commend you. That's a very good statement, and I 
think it frames the issues before the whole nation right now. 

General Shinseki. We'll just go in that order right on down. 

GEN. SHINSEKI: Mr. Chairman, I don't have a formal opening or written statement, but I would 
like to assure you that, much as the chairman and Admiral Mies have done, I'd like to add my 
thanks to the committee for the great support the Army has received. I'd also like to lend my 
support to the chairman's statement on where the chiefs stand. It is my position as well. And I 
would like to express my confidence in Admiral Mies's assessment of risk as he has outlined in 
his opening statement, and also his plan for dealing with that risk in meeting our responsibilities. 

And with that, I'll stand ready for questions. 

SEN. WARNER: Thank you very much. Admiral Johnson. 

ADM. JOHNSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Allow me to add my own thanks to you and the 
committee for calling this important hearing. The subject is worthy of our most serious review, 
analysis and debate, and we stand ready to be active participants in that. Thank you, sir. 

SEN. WARNER: Thank you. General Ryan. 

GEN. RYAN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It's a pleasure to be here. I have no formal statement 
except to reiterate some of the points that were made here, particularly the need to continue to 
have a viable deterrent force based on a flexible capability to survive with survivable nuclear 
weapons and sufficient not only with respect to a bilateral treaty with Russia but with any 
emerging nations that come forth with a strong nuclear capability, which we see in China and 
others. And I thank you for calling this hearing on a very, very important strategic issue, 
important to the survival of this nation. Thank you, sir. 

SEN. WARNER: Indeed, it is; and to many of our allies also, the policies we set. General Jones. 

GEN. JONES: Mr. Chairman, thank you. I associate myself fully with the comments of the 
chairman and our commander-in-chief to my left. Clearly whatever we do ought not to be driven 
by a predetermined number of systems to be agreed to; rather, it should be derived from a 
strategy that reflects what is clearly in our national interest and in the interest of our allies, that is 
independent of the economic realities that appear to be at the heart of current Russian 
motivations in this regard, that reflects considerable thought with regard to emerging global 
realities and the expanding nuclear weapons club and that considers the tactical nuclear weapons 
imbalance as a fact that clearly bears on this problem. 

We should also recognize that the journey is more important than the destination, since strategic 
force reductions are essentially irreversible. The United States, in my judgment, continues to 
require a worst-case deterrent capability vice a best-case capability. And the process to do all of 
these things is ongoing. It's a difficult issue, difficult subject, and will take time. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

SEN. WARNER: I thank you, General. Admiral, you don't have anything further to add at this 
time. General Shelton, under the Goldwater-Nickles legislation, this committee took the initiative 
and indeed the Congress followed in making available to each and every member of the Joint 
Chiefs the opportunity to go directly and see the president if they felt so strongly about an issue. 
In this instance, do I judge that this distinguished group of chiefs have reached a consensus 
among themselves, and has any chief indicated a desire to go directly to the president, so far as 
you know, and express his views? 

GEN. SHELTON: Mr. Chairman, the consensus reached was that we did, in fact, support the 
Helsinki framework. We have outlined some of the issues this morning that we will have to 
debate, will have to take into consideration, as we move toward the Helsinki framework. But all 
of us felt very comfortable, and none of the chiefs have gone forward expressing or have 
expressed in a (tank?) session any disagreement with the Helsinki framework. 

SEN. WARNER: I think that's important that we understand that. And we recognize the 
confidentiality of your procedures and your debate among yourselves, but I judge it was a very 
thorough and lengthy debate among the chiefs over a period of time on this issue before you 
arrived at that consensus. Would that be correct? 

GEN. SHELTON: That is correct, Mr. Chairman, and on numerous occasions. 

SEN. WARNER: Now, again, I think we should all look at the forthcoming summit in a positive 
-- certainly I do -- a positive framework. Nevertheless, accompanying summits is a flurry of 
reports that come out initially before, during, and then, of course, the statement that is issued 
afterwards. And now there are indications that Russia wants to go below the Helsinki numbers. 
You have indicated your concurrence with the Helsinki, and therefore I presume opposition to 
going below. Is that correct? 

GEN. SHELTON: Mr. Chairman, as of today, the only thing we've seen from the Russians has 
been what's been reported in the press, their statement about wanting to go down possibly as low 
as 1,500. And the Joint Chiefs, again, support Helsinki. We have not been asked to consider 
anything that is outside the Helsinki framework. 

SEN. WARNER: Well, then I want to ask a very carefully drafted question, which I will read, 
hoping that I can probe that comment of yours a bit further. In the 1997 Helsinki joint statement 
on parameters on future reductions in nuclear forces, President Clinton and President Yeltsin 
agreed to a tentative START III structure that would entail further reductions in deployed 
strategic warheads to between 2,000 and 2,500 per side. 

The White House fact sheet released on March 21, 1997 -- and I ask that be made a part of 
today's record -- indicated that such reductions would represent a 30 to 45 percent reduction in 
the number of deployed strategic warheads permitted under START II and more than a 65 
percent reduction in the number of warheads permitted under START I. 

It's my understanding that the chiefs have endorsed the Helsinki framework but would have 
reservations -- I repeat, reservations -- about any START III agreement that would require 
reductions below the Helsinki levels. What concerns, if any, do you have about reductions below 
the Helsinki levels? And I'll ask each of you to respond to that question. First, General. 

GEN. SHELTON: Mr. Chairman, again, it is hard to get into any detail in an open session. I 
outlined -- you outlined some of the concerns that I believe we would need to address. Myself 
and Admiral Mies outlined some others. First of all, we would need to make sure that any 
anticipated reductions at any point did not impact our conventional force. 

But right up front you ask how a reduction below these levels would contribute to the security of 
the United States -- 

SEN. WARNER: Or not contribute. 

GEN. SHELTON: Or not contribute. But in our case we approach it from how does it contribute 
to our security, and what does it do to stability -- how would it affect our ability to carry out the 
current guidance? Everything that the Joint Chiefs, Admiral Mies does, is related to what we 
have been asked to do by our civilian leadership. That is the presidential directives PDD 60 from 
the president, as well as the nuclear weapons deployment guidance that is given to us by the 
secretary of Defense. And then there are a whole host of other issues that are associated with it, 
such as the tactical imbalance that we have and what percentage of those weapons might have 
strategic application. We have reliability -- as you reduce your warheads, how reliability starts to 
affect your available number of weapons. Again, I think it's important that upfront we understand 
that the total numbers do not -- are not equal to the available numbers. You have different 
platforms that are in maintenance; you have a host of warheads at any point that are not available 
for a given number of reasons. And again, at the very worst case, which is how the Joint Chiefs 
look at it, do we have the capability at the reduced numbers, whatever that number is we have 
been asked to look at, to make sure that we are survivable and that we could still carry out our 
mission, and produce unacceptable damage, unacceptable risks for the potential adversary, so 
that he in fact would be discouraged from launching against us to start with? That's just a few of 
the issues. 

But the bottom line is as you start to come down you need to make sure that you have taken a 
look, a hard look at the guidance that is given to go with those numbers, and also that you have 
the underlying analysis that you had in fact war gamed against a potential adversary to ensure 
that those things that are near and dear to our citizens, specifically to the Joint Chiefs for our 
national security, are in fact taken into account. 

SEN. WARNER: General, you have mentioned the underlying analysis. I find that the absence of 
a comprehensive review of this subject -- in other words, contemporary review -- to be a distinct 
handicap as we move into this series of negotiations. Would it not have been helpful for you and 
the chiefs to have had such a review, as you worked on your deliberations and preparation for 
such guidance as you wished to make to the president in this forthcoming (summer ?)? 

GEN. SHELTON: Mr. Chairman, we feel very comfortable with the Helsinki framework that has 
been laid out. If we wanted to depart from that framework in any way, then we need to pause and 
do the necessary review, the necessary analysis, to ensure that any departure from that 
framework show that our national security in fact is as good as it is today or enhanced. 

SEN. WARNER: Now, basically the framework -- a question for each of you -- is the Helsinki 
Accords and any discussion to go below those levels, what the implications you feel would be on 
our strategic deterrence policy; and, secondly, the absence of a review. General Shinseki? That is 
a comprehensive review to help guide your discussion. 

GEN. SHINSEKI: Mr. Chairman, I think that's worthy of discussion. I would go back to the 
chairman's position. The last analysis that I am privy to is the Helsinki Accord in which the 
analysis, the assessments were made -- Admiral Mies's discussion of deterrence and stability -- 
it's not just about numbers -- is all included in that assessment. I am very comfortable with the 
numbers as laid out in meeting our strategic guidance, provided to us in the deliberations that 
went into the Helsinki Accords -- those numbers are what we have. And I think further 
assessment, analysis, would be required for any other discussion. 

SEN. WARNER: Are you concerned from the standpoint of our nation's policy if we were to go 
below those numbers at Helsinki? 

GEN. SHINSEKI: Until you do the analysis, Mr. Chairman, it would be difficult to answer that 
question. But I -- 

SEN. WARNER: Okay, when you do the analysis -- well, we're at the summit -- supposing the 
summit came out with some type of agreement between the two to go below and the analysis 
hadn't been made -- that's the very question that's before us. 

GEN. SHINSEKI: Well, as we have all indicated, Mr. Chairman, the Helsinki numbers are the 
last set of detailed analysis provided. 

SEN. WARNER: Right. Admiral Johnson? 

ADM. JOHNSON: I am in agreement with the chairman and General Shinseki, sir. I am quite 
comfortable with the Helsinki framework as described this morning. I am quite uncomfortable 
going outside the Helsinki framework without the requisite analysis on a subject of such major 
strategic importance. 

SEN. WARNER: I thank you for that forthright answer. 

General Ryan? 

GEN. RYAN: I agree with my colleagues to the right -- SEN. WARNER: That's the chief of 
naval operations, yes. 

GEN. RYAN: Absolutely -- in that the -- we have not looked at the implication below, but some 
of the things that start to emerge as you think about numbers below 2,000 to 2,500 bring into 
question the strategy in an overall sense, and also what tactical nuclear weapons issues start to 
emerge as they take on strategic significance because of their numbers. So I agree. I am 
uncomfortable below the Helsinki Accords. 

SEN. WARNER: I thank you very much, and I am glad you brought the tactical issue up. That 
was to be my second question. But my time is running short, so I hope another member 
addresses the tactical issue. If not I'll on my return address this issue. 

General Jones? 

GEN. JONES: Mr. Chairman, I agree with the CNO's summation entirely. 

SEN. WARNER: The chief of naval operations. And I thank you then. 

Admiral Mies? 

ADM. MIES: Mr. Chairman, I am happy to address your question in much greater detail in 
closed session. But I would say that I do feel that we have conducted within the Helsinki 
framework and have had the opportunity to brief both the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the chairman, and 
the members of the secretary of Defense's staff, including the secretary, in a very comprehensive 
way, on the concerns and risks associated with reductions to lower numbers. I think just 
outlining the major points, and I certainly agree with the CNO's assessment, Senator Levin spoke 
very eloquently of the responsibilities on both the policy side and the military side. And I think 
from my pure strategy standpoint, as you go lower and lower in numbers, and you retain the 
existing strategy, you at some point in time have difficult executing that national strategy, and 
you get in a situation where you have disconnects, strategy-to-task disconnects in your ability to 
execute the strategy. And therefore, to a certain degree as you go lower you have to have a 
comprehensive review and possible changes to your strategic guidance. 

Secondly, I would argue that, as I said in my statement, stability becomes a principal concern as 
you go lower and lower and lower. And there is a cushion in larger numbers. And there is a 
tyranny in smaller numbers that reduces stability in certain situations. So the issue is not parity in 
numbers as much as it is stability that ought to be the criteria. And that has to -- that requires a 
fair amount of dynamic analysis and war gaming to convince yourself that your forces are 
postured and their capabilities are such that you can deter under a wide variety of situations. 

I think finally the bottom line has to be as you think about lower and lower numbers the real 
issue is how do you articulate the case that those lower numbers enhance our national security 
and make us -- 

SEN. WARNER: Or not enhance -- I want that to be stressed. 

ADM. MIES: Or not enhanced, to make us more stable and more secure. 

SEN. WARNER: I'd pick up on one of your words, "disconnect." The fundamental premise -- we 
have always got to work with in arms control is what is in the minds of a potential adversary: Do 
they perceive a weakness? And in my judgment those disconnects would provide a basis for the 
perception in an adversary of a weakness in our deterrence policy. Do you agree with that? 

ADM. MIES: That's certainly a consideration in our deliberations, and will always be a 
consideration: How much is adequate to deter under what situations? And there certainly is a 
subjective evaluation that goes into that. 

SEN. WARNER: Thank you. 

ADM. MIES: Yes, sir. 

SEN. WARNER: Now, Secretary Slocombe, you have had the benefit of hearing the chiefs. I 
think out of respect of the secretary and the president you should be the final one to respond, and 
then I'll turn to Senator Levin. 

MR. SLOCOMBE: I would simply emphasize that the position of the United States is that the 
numbers for a possible START III agreement should be the Helsinki numbers. Before we would 
-- the Russians have obviously proposed lower numbers -- that's a matter of public record. 
Before we would agree to go to lower numbers, we would certainly do the analysis and the 
complete consultation with the CINC and with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that I agree would be 
fully required under that assumption. 

But our present policy is that the Helsinki numbers are the appropriate numbers for START III. 

SEN. WARNER: I think that's a very good response. 

Senator Levin? 

SEN. LEVIN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

SEN. WARNER: For our colleagues -- we'll try to do each a six- minute round, and then go to a 
second round if that will be necessary, and then move as quickly as we can into a closed session. 

SEN. LEVIN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First let me commend our witnesses this morning for 
their testimony and for their determination not to prejudge the outcome of an analysis before it's 
made. That may sound obvious, but I am afraid it is not always obvious. Each one of you have 
said that you have not been presented with a proposal to a specific number below the Helsinki 
numbers, and that until you are you are going to withhold judgment. You have indicated you 
have a number of concerns which would have to be addressed -- legitimate concerns all. There 
may be some additional concerns as well, and some additional factors I would think that you 
would be considering if an when such a proposal comes before you. 

For instance, would you be looking at the change in the conventional targets that might exist in 
other countries in the last few years? Would that be a factor? The reduction in the number of 
conventional targets reflecting the reduction in conventional capability in other countries, if there 
had been such a reduction in the last few years? Would a factor -- would you consider for 
instance the proposed reduced number of nuclear targets in such a proposal? Presumably if there 
is a proposed reduction in the number of weapons that would mean at least some reduction in the 
number of nuclear silos or nuclear targets in the other country. Would factors such as that be 
included in your deliberations on any such proposal? General Shelton? 

GEN. SHELTON: Senator Levin, certainly those would in fact be part of the analysis, along 
with, as we have mentioned, several other very significant factors that would have to be taken 
into consideration. 

SEN. LEVIN: And there may be many other -- 

GEN. SHELTON: Many others, yes, sir. 

SEN. LEVIN: Let me -- Secretary Slocombe, let me ask you this question: What does the 
Pentagon take into consideration when looking at these proposals in this regard? Do you look at 
the damage that would be caused by a U.S. retaliatory attack -- not just to the specific targets, but 
for instance the number of civilians that would be killed by such an attack under various 
scenarios? 

MR. SLOCOMBE: Certainly one of the factors which is taken into account in any analysis of the 
adequacy of a plan is the damage it would cause -- and there are a variety of measures of 
damage. As a matter of policy, the United States does not target civilians. But there is no 
question that any use of nuclear weapons would involve very substantial civilian casualties, and 
there are models for attempting to estimate what those casualties would be. 

SEN. LEVIN: Would that be a factor in any opponent's mind as to the deterrence of our 
retaliatory attack, the deterrence effect? 

MR. SLOCOMBE: I think it inevitably would be a factor. I think, particularly given some of the 
countries that are relevant here, it wouldn't be the only factor, or necessarily even the most 
important factor. 

SEN. LEVIN: And -- but it would be a factor? 

MR. SLOCOMBE: Certainly. 

SEN. LEVIN: And would you be able to supply us in closed session with -- under each of the 
scenarios -- what those casualties are? 

MR. SLOCOMBE: I don't personally have those numbers with me, even for closed session. 
Admiral Mies may. 

SEN. LEVIN: Do you have those with you, admiral? 

ADM. MIES: I have probably some numbers with me. But I certainly don't think I have a 
comprehensive listing for all the possible scenarios that we -- that are required. So I would 
certainly take that question for the record. 

SEN. LEVIN: What is the role of our conventional capability in all of these analyses? For 
instance, if we have a huge conventional imbalance in our favor, is that a factor in terms of a 
deterrence policy? Does that factor into a strategic deterrence policy? 

MR. SLOCOMBE: I would rather discuss that issue in closed session, if I could, sir. 

SEN. LEVIN: The presidential directive in 1997 -- and I think here I am safe to say this is 
unclassified -- what I am going to say the emphasis in that directive is on deterring nuclear war -- 
is that correct? 

MR. SLOCOMBE: Yes. 

SEN. LEVIN: And that the guidance removes all previous references to waging a nuclear war 
successfully and prevailing in a protracted nuclear war -- is that correct? 

MR. SLOCOMBE: I don't have in my head what parts of that directive have been released 
publicly. But we have said that this is a policy which has been the policy of the United States for 
a long time, that a nuclear war could not be won and must never be fought. That one of the 
principles -- 

SEN. LEVIN: Would you just provide that for the record, as to what I said, as to whether it's 
accurate or not specifically? 

MR. SLOCOMBE: Well, because it is a question is something not there -- let me explain -- N 

SEN. LEVIN: No, something was removed from a previous directive that's my question. 

MR. SLOCOMBE: Of course it supersedes the previous directive. 

SEN. LEVIN: I just want to know whether or not there was any references in the previous 
directives which were removed in 1997. That's my question. You could give us that for the 
record. 

MR. SLOCOMBE: Sure. 

SEN. LEVIN: Thanks. Now, I went through a number of questions and gave my judgment as to 
what was civilian policy, what would be military decisions, and I am wondering whether or not 
we could go through those and, Secretary Slocombe, you could tell me whether or not what your 
judgment is on it. What is necessary to deter -- is that a policy decision or is that a military 
decision? 

MR. SLOCOMBE: Ultimately it is a policy decision, but it has to be informed by military advice 
about how an exchange would work. 

SEN. LEVIN: All right. Now, as to what number of percentage of targets need to be destroyed in 
order to deter? Is that a policy question or a military question? 

MR. SLOCOMBE: Ultimately I think all of these questions are policy questions in the sense that 
ultimately even military judgments are subject under our Constitution to civilian control. But the 
question of whether -- how much is enough is I think ultimately a policy judgment, but it has to 
be informed by understanding the military consequences of a course of action. 

SEN. LEVIN: When the president is given his options, or given proposals, is he told what 
percentage of various types of targets would be destroyed and what civilian population 
destruction would exist under each of the various options? Is that part of his presidential 
directive's background, or is that something that the Pentagon does for the first time in 
implementing more general policy guidelines? 

MR. SLOCOMBE: In general the latter. 

SEN. LEVIN: So that -- okay, now, is that done by the -- is that analysis, 80 percent, 70 percent, 
90 percent of various types of targets would be eliminated under various scenarios -- is that done 
by the civilians in the Pentagon, or is that done by the Chiefs? 

MR. SLOCOMBE: It's done by STRATCOM in a quite transparent way. The actual analysis is 
done at STRATCOM, and the results insofar as relevant to details of how the analysis is done are 
transparent, both to the joint staff and to a very small group of people in the joint staff, and in the 
civilian side in OSD. 

SEN. LEVIN: And finally, does STRATCOM or do you or do the chiefs decide that a certain 
percentage of targets would need to be destroyed in order to deter? Is that a civilian decision? Is 
that a STRATCOM decision? Is that a Joint Chiefs decision that a certain percentage of each 
type of targets would need to be destroyed in order to deter? 

MR. SLOCOMBE: We -- I'd really rather answer that question in closed session, because it has 
to do with how we evaluate the -- how we evaluate the various options. 

SEN. LEVIN: Thank you. My time is up. Thank you. Thank you all. 

SEN. WARNER: Senator Inhofe. 

SEN. INHOFE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all, I am hoping that we will get -- we have -- 
just real good straightforward answers. It bothers me when we talk about going into executive 
session. I can remember when -- because the public needs to hear these things. I was very proud, 
General Ryan, of General Jumper when he came out and told the truth about what our 
competition is doing in air-to-air and air- to-ground combat vehicles. It's a wake-up call for 
America. It's necessary. I was very proud of George Tenet when he appeared before this 
committee and agreed that we are in the most threatened position as a nation that we have been 
in in this nation's history, because of the nature of what's out there. Several of us have disagreed 
with -- and I am very pleased that the chairman brought up the ABM Treaty and the mutual-
assured destruction strategy, how that no longer has application today. Certainly even Henry 
Kissinger is saying that may have made sense back when they had two superpowers. But it's, 
quote, "nuts" to make a virtue out of our vulnerability. So it's a different world now than it was. 

I would like to read to you -- having been one of only four members of the Senate to vote against 
the ratification of the START II Treaty, I would like to read the statement that I made on the 
Senate floor at that time: 

My major concern is that the START II Treaty is being interpreted by the Clinton administration 
and by some in Russia as precluding our right and our ability to build the kind of effective 
missile defense that we need. On December 28th, 1995, President Clinton vetoed the Defense 
authorization bill by saying its further steps toward national missile defense would set U.S. 
policy on a collision course with the ABM Treaty, jeopardizing Russian ratification of START 
II. The president's clear message is that he believes the START II and the national missile 
defense are incompatible. Apparently some Russians agree. 

I went on to complete my statement, in finally saying if the president believes that the priority of 
protecting the American people with defense must be sacrificed to gain Russian approval of 
START II, then I say it's a price that's too high to pay. And I am not reading that to imply that I 
was prophetic at that time, but what I felt was true at that time I still feel is true today. 

So I am hoping that we will be able to respond to some of these things so that the public can be 
made aware of it. First of all, a lot of discussion has been made toward the framework of the 
Helsinki Accord. So let's say we are talking about somewhere between 2,000 and 2,500 
warheads. If that's true, we have to figure out how to get there. And you folks are the experts, 
and certainly you know how to get there. So we would have to get let's say from 6,000 down to 
2,000 that would be 4,000. 

If we were to use 50 Peacekeepers, that would score in our counting, as 500, I understand. I 
believe that's correct, Admiral Mies. De- MIRVing the Minuteman IIIs would be about 1,000. 
The other area is not quite as easy to work with because we're talking about knocking down the 
Ohio class inventory from 18 to 14, which I think everyone agrees is something that may be 
desirable, and then reducing some of the warheads. That's comes to about 1,000. That still means 
that we're 1,500 short. 

Now, my question would be, to Admiral Johnson, and General Ryan, and Admiral Mies, because 
they're the ones that would be affected by this, in order to get down there, you're going to have to 
do something to our inventory of B-52s, our Ohio class submarines, and both of these vehicles 
have conventional capabilities. So, my question would be, what is this going to have, what is this 
going to do in damaging our conventional capabilities if we have to do that? And maybe we don't 
have to -- maybe one of the three of you can tell us what else we can do. We'll start with Admiral 
Mies, if you would, please. 

ADM. MIES: In general response to your question, the counting rules and the attribution rules 
that we have referred to in the START framework pose problems as you come lower and lower 
and force you to difficult choices. And sometimes unintended consequences result from that. It's 
very clear to get to the number 2,000 you have mentioned, you would need some degree of 
counting rule relief for modification or attribution change to preserve your conventional 
capability, the conventional capability particularly of your bomber force, to reach that number. 
And so there's a framework issue there with regard to the implications for not just your strategic 
forces and the capability that you would like to retain at lower numbers, but also for your 
conventional force capability, and understanding how those counting rules and attribution rules 
impact that capability is very important, and understanding, too, what kind of relief you could 
conceivably get in a negotiation to modify those counting rules and -- 

SEN. INHOFE: I do want to come back to that, but I'm running out of time here and I wanted to 
get to General Ryan concerning the B-52s. 

GEN. RYAN: Yes, sir. We need some either counting rule relief or re-attribution as the numbers 
come below about -- down to the Helsinki Accord levels in order to protect conventional bomber 
capability, and that would be part of the negotiation as we went to that level. 

SEN. INHOFE: Okay. Then, then do all of you agree that we would have to have some counting 
rule changes in order to do this? Do you generally agree, Admiral Johnson, with Admiral Mies 
and his comments? 

ADM. JOHNSON: I do, Senator Inhofe. 

SEN. INHOFE: All right. One last question, Mr. Chairman. I know my time has expired, but in 
an article recently, this is 11 May 2000, Admiral Mies, the Washington Times indicated that you 
believed, and this was a quote, -- U.S. Strategic Command needs about 2,500 warheads to 
execute its nuclear deterrence and war-fighting missions. I -- when I read that, I kind of had that 
down as a minimum figure. Did you mean that -- first of all, is the quote accurate? And secondly, 
did you mean that as a minimum figure? 

ADM. MIES: The quote's not accurate because I have never talked to anybody in the media 
about this issue, and I have never discussed this in an unclassified forum, and so I can honestly 
tell you that the quote is entirely inaccurate. I have, as I have already briefed you, given my 
assessments of the risks and concerns as you come down to lower levels, and I have briefed the 
chairman and the joint chiefs and the secretary of defense and his staff on this issues, but I have 
never made a declaratory statement of that nature. 

SEN. INHOFE: Thank you, Admiral Mies. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

SEN. WARNER: Thank you very much. Senator Lieberman. 

SEN. JOSEPH LIEBERMAN (D-CT): Thanks -- thanks very much, Mr. Chairman. And 
gentlemen, thank you. I appreciate the extent to which we're all acknowledging, though there's a 
natural way, as we talk about these arms control agreements that we talk numbers of warheads, 
of deployed warheads, that there is a, necessarily a strategy and a guideline, and in this case a 
presidential directive behind those numbers. And my question is this, and derives somewhat 
from the new context we're in as we're focused on emerging nuclear powers and rogue states. 
And the question is, to what extent, if any, have we adjusted our nuclear strategy to account for 
new or emerging nuclear capable states? And I ask that particularly with regard to START III 
discussions, because if I have it correctly, the goals that were set out in Helsinki for START III 
are to be achieved by 2007. By 2007, presumably the nuclear status quo in the world will be 
different than it is today. 

So, perhaps I should begin with Secretary Slocombe and then ask General Shelton and Admiral 
Mies if they want to add. To what extend does our nuclear strategy, is it dynamic, and even 
today, to what extent does it allow for emerging nuclear states? 

MR. SLOCOMBE: Yes, it is dynamic. It does allow or take into account changes in the overall 
strategic situation, not just the balance or the relationship with Russia. I would make the 
observation in numerical terms, the Russian forces is so very much larger than any other force 
that is gonna exist for a long time into the future, but in many of the numerical arguments and the 
arguments about highly sophisticated capabilities, the enduring requirement to be able, if the 
situation came up, to deter Russia pretty much dominates that part of the analysis. In many ways, 
the problem of dealing with third countries is more difficult, but it's not primarily an issue of 
numbers of nuclear weapons. 

SEN. LIEBERMAN: General Shelton, do you want to add to that? 

GEN. SHELTON: I want to say, Senator Lieberman, I think you put your finger right on one of 
the things. I mentioned as one of the last concerns, not necessarily in that order, the fact that we 
are in a more multi-polar world from a nuclear perspective even than we were when we first 
adopted the Helsinki framework back in '97. Today, we see India, Pakistan, potentially on the 
horizon, we see North Korea, as the chairman mentioned, potentially Iraq. We've got Iran. We've 
got China, with an uncertain path as to where they're going at this particular time. And so, it is 
one of the concerns that we feel we must address in the new, in the guidance discussions that 
would accompany any further reductions. 

SEN. LIEBERMAN: Thank you. Admiral Mies. 

ADM. MIES: I would agree with both Mr. Slocombe and the chairman. The whole issue of multi 
-- the need to address multi-polar stability as you address a bilateral treaty framework is a critical 
issue that obviously is of concern, particularly as new threats emerge, threats that may be today 
unpredictable. Additionally, I would say that the guidance that goes into the development of the 
strategy is very dynamic. It gets routinely reviewed, and issues of concern are routinely brought 
to the highest levels of national leadership for revision in the interpretation of the presidential 
decision directive. The presidential decision directive itself, there was a comprehensive review 
conducted, and one of the reasons that the presidential decision directive was issued, and the 
previous directive was canceled, was the very issue of how do you address emerging rogue 
nation threats. 

SEN. LIEBERMAN: If the -- our nuclear strategy then considers emerging nuclear threats, 
including those from countries that we would consider rogue nations, how does this strategy 
make the judgment that we've been dealing with here as we cross the bridge to developing a 
national missile defense, which is that unlike the Cold War, where we were dealing with a very 
powerful adversary but one we assumed was rationally and therefore we ended up with a theory 
of mutual assured destruction -- crazy in it's way, literally mad, but somehow it worked. If we're 
dealing here now, and some of the emerging nuclear states with leadership whose stability we 
question, how do we allow for that in the development of our nuclear strategy? In other words, is 
there a role for deterrence, nuclear deterrence, as we deal in the process, as you develop the 
strategy with emerging nations that are led by people that we fear are not stable or rational? 
Secretary Slocombe. 

MR. SLOCOMBE: There certainly is a role for deterrence, even in that situation. I think it's less 
that people like this are irrational as that they have a very different set of values than other 
people, including they may be less risk averse. They may put a very low value on the suffering of 
their own population and a greater value on the survival of the regime and being able to 
dominate a region. Deterrence -- we have made clear that any use of weapons of mass 
destruction against the United States or our forces or our allies would meet with prompt and 
overwhelming response, from which no weapon in the American military arsenal would be 
excluded. I think that is a powerful deterrent. I think, as someone who was not in the government 
at the time, I think that that message conveyed to Saddam Hussein had a powerful deterrent 
effect on him during the Gulf War. 

SEN. LIEBERMAN: And you think it would to leaders of other rogue nations? 

MR. SLOCOMBE: I think it has a powerful deterrent effect. The reason that we are considering 
so carefully the possibility of a limited national missile defense is I personally believe it would 
also be valuable to make such an attack not only fatal because of the certainty of retaliation, but 
futile because it would not actually succeed in carrying out the mission which was assigned to it. 
But I think there's no question that the prospect of deterrence by retaliation is an extremely 
important element in dealing with rogue states as with others. 

SEN. LIEBERMAN: General Shelton or Admiral Mies, do you want to add to that answer? 

GEN. SHELTON: I fully concur with Mr. Slocombe. I would only add that I think that that is an 
extremely important part of our policy, the deterrent effect, and also that the potential adversary 
understands up front that should deterrence fail there will be a terrific price to pay for that. 

SEN. LIEBERMAN: Right. Admiral Mies. 

ADM. MIES: I agree entirely with what's been said. I think the challenge for us as we deal with 
some of the emerging threats is that the greater danger is there may be threats that we can't deter, 
threats that are faceless, that from the terrorist threats. 

SEN. LIEBERMAN: From non-state entities, for instance. 

ADM. MIES: As one example. 

SEN. LIEBERMAN: Yes. 

ADM. MIES: And therefore, there may be instances where deterrence alone is not enough. But 
clearly deterrence has a very, very important role as we look to the nature of these threats and 
their emergence. 

SEN. LIEBERMAN: And in those cases where deterrence was not enough, presumably we 
would want to have some sort of defense capability. 

ADM. MIES: I think that's an issue that we have to address as a national policy, and I think that 
debate is clearly ongoing as to how you want to deal with it. 

SEN. LIEBERMAN: Right. Thanks. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

SEN. WARNER: Senator Smith. 

SEN. BOB SMITH (R-NH): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me pick up, Mr. Chairman, where 
you suggested we might go, which would be to the tactical area. Is there anyone who would 
disagree with me if I said that there's not a clear line of demarcation today between strategic 
weapons and many of our, other tactical weapons that we may face? Since no one is disagreeing, 
I would say that then you are in agreement with that statement. So let me ask this question, and 
maybe we could have each of you answer, starting with -- 

SEN. WARNER: Mr. Smith, if I could interrupt you, and I'll do this on my time, not yours, but I 
think for those following this hearing, and indeed there's a vast network of communications from 
this room across the nation, I think we need some distinction between the strategic and the 
tactical. Basically, the strategic are the intercontinental that go way up to very a very high apogee 
and come down, whereas the tactical can be launched from submarines and ships, surface ships, 
and some versions of our aircraft. But, Admiral, I think it's important for our viewers to 
understand that as Senator Smith presses this. Do you want to clarify anything I said? 

ADM. MIES: I think that's true in a general context, but I think the lines of distinction between 
strategic and tactical are often blurred and tend to be treaty distinctions more than their real 
distinctions -- 

SEN. WARNER: Just for those trying to follow this important hearing -- 

ADM. MIES: -- clearly some of the weapons, tactical weapons, that fall under the tactical 
category can be used with strategic effect -- and have relatively long ranges and identical or 
similar capabilities. 

SEN. SMITH: Right on that point, Admiral, are we being constrained in any way by these long-
term agreements? In what we can do with our, either strategic or tactical weapons? 

ADM. MIES: I think the fundamental issue that we need to address is as we come lower and 
lower in the START framework, what START doesn't do is it doesn't in any way address the 
non-strategic nuclear warheads in a meaningful way. And so the issue is in a future START III 
environment to essentially capture some of those non-strategic nuclear weapons which are to a 
certain degree unconstrained by the existing treaties. 

SEN. SMITH: Well, let me ask it this way, and have someone else certainly respond. If we were 
to agree to an aggregate warhead total of 2,500, say, how important would it be to have theater 
nuclear missiles, for example, or even non-deployed warheads be part of the count? General 
Shelton. 

GEN. SHELTON: Well, Senator -- SEN. SMITH: Would you agree that we should have them as 
part -- could you make the case that they should be made part of the count, based on what we 
know of the differences, the blending between tactical and strategic? 

GEN. SHELTON: Senator Smith, as you're aware, we do have an INF Treaty that addresses it. 
But when you look at START, the tactical nuclear weapons, per se, are not addressed. And as a 
result of the imbalance that exists between Russia and the United States, that ranges anywhere 
from about roughly on a ratio of -- I can't go into the exact numbers because it's a, because it's 
open -- but from about 4.1 to 14 to 1 ratios, we feel like that as you bring those numbers down, 
specifically if you look at going outside the Helsinki framework, that needs to be wrapped into 
the discussion, because as these numbers get lower and lower, these tactical nuclear weapons that 
could have strategic implications, or strategic applicability, need to be addressed. 

SEN. SMITH: Well, when -- Mr. Secretary, was the last comprehensive review of U.S. 
deterrence at the Helsinki time, was that accurate? When was -- 

MR. SLOCOMBE: There was a comprehensive review of the significance of the Helsinki levels, 
and the last kind of formal review was the so-called "nuclear posture review" which was, I think, 
in 1995. 

SEN. SMITH: Okay. In that review, did you, did you factor in the number of different countries, 
number one, that -- other than obviously the former Soviet Union-- 

GEN. SHELTON: Yes. 

SEN. SMITH: -- now Russia? And number two, did you factor in the ability or capability of 
tactical weapons to assume some strategic possibility? 

GEN. SHELTON: Yes. This tactical weapons argument can cut both ways. As I think you know, 
the Russians for many years have taken the position that because American and other NATO 
aircraft in Europe can deliver nuclear weapons to Russia, to the Soviet Union as it then was, they 
should be counted as equivalent to strategic weapons. The issue of the significance of tactical 
nuclear weapons, of their military utility, is certainly one of the very important issues we have to 
look at. And it's one of the reasons that the U.S. has insisted that one of the items on the Helsinki 
agenda be dealing with tactical nuclear weapons. 

SEN. SMITH: So, I want to make sure I get a clear answer. So, it is the position of the chiefs 
here and the secretary that we should not count any tactical nukes in the count toward meeting 
that 2,500? 

GEN. SHELTON: That's the position of the United States. 

SEN. SMITH: Is that the position of the joint chiefs? 

ADM. MIES (?): I would just qualify, it's important to recognize that the 2,500, the 2,000 to 
2,500 doesn't count strategic warheads to begin with. It counts -- it counts strategic delivery 
systems, the launches, and attributes those launches. So, when you start talking about a 
framework that would count aggregate warheads, tactical and non -- strategic and non-strategic, 
in a sense you're talking about a completely different framework, because the framework, as 
currently structured, is built on launcher accountability, not on warhead accountability. 

SEN. SMITH: It's also built on the mutual assured destruction concept of the Soviet Union 
versus the United States, and I don't, personally, I don't think that we've factored in enough of the 
current threat and we're focusing on a treaty that goes back several, several years. Just one final 
question -- direct specific question, as my time's expired -- Admiral Johnson, would it be helpful 
under the counting rules to exclude submarines undergoing maintenance that are off-line? 

ADM. JOHNSON: I think that's one of the things we ought to look at in terms of counting rule 
relief, yes. 

SEN. SMITH: Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

SEN. WARNER. Thank you very much. Senator Reed. According to our calculations, Senator 
Reed, you followed Senator Lieberman in joining the -- 

SEN. JACK REED (D-RI): But let me yield to Senator Landrieu. 

SEN. WARNER: We'll be happy to (receive ?) Senator Landrieu at this time. Thank you very 
much. 

SEN. MARY LANDRIEU (D-LA): Thank you, Senators. I would like to associate myself with 
the remarks of Senator Levin, and I hope that this hearing can be helpful today. Obviously 
Congress does have a role to play, a clear and specific role, as the United States periodically 
reviews our nuclear force structure. 

On the other hand, though, Mr. Chairman, I do want to say for the record that when our country 
is preparing negotiations on a treaty, particularly one as important and as sensitive as START III, 
I believe that those of us in Congress, both Democrats and Republicans, in a nonpartisan way, 
should support the executive branch and not interfere with treaty negotiations that could be quite 
beneficial. 

We should let our various views be known. We are entitled to our opinions and to our analysis. 
That's why the people of our states elected us to serve. And we can seek to influence those 
negotiations through letters, floor statements, meetings that are appropriate, press releases; there 
are many tools available to us. 

But I do want to say for the record that our seeking to ascertain or determine the U.S. bottom line 
in a public or even a closed hearing does not, in my view, assist U.S. negotiators. Nor does it 
necessarily guarantee the desired outcome of every member of this committee without doubt, 
which is the increased security and strength of the United States of America. 

So I think that today's hearing has been somewhat helpful. I hope the statements remain helpful 
in the ways that our country needs to move forward. There are many good questions answered. I 
look forward to further discussions at our non-public hearing where we can be a little bit more 
specific. But I would say that I appreciate the issues raised to help us perhaps reframe our future 
plans regarding transparency, third-party stockpile issues, the reliability of our current stockpile, 
the questions about deterrence, the importance of deterrence in terms of retaliation against 
weapons of mass destruction and some other things that are very important for us to consider. 

Since many of my questions were answered, I will retain the rest of my questions for the closed 
meeting. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

SEN. WARNER: Thank you very much, Senator. And the chair wishes to advise we have such 
good attendance here as members, and the time of the meetings we each have at noon will 
require us to conclude the open session as soon as each member has had their opportunity to ask 
the questions in open and proceed directly to S-407, where we will resume our hearing. 

Senator Sessions. 

SEN. JEFF SESSIONS (R-AL): Mr. Chairman, this is indeed an important matter. I know that 
we ought to try to serve in partnership with the executive branch as they negotiate treaties, and 
we certainly have the ability to make some progress on START II and maybe go beyond START 
II in reduction of weaponry. But from what I've been able to ascertain, when we're talking about 
a range of 1,500, that is below what we can accept. And I think there will be congressional 
outcry over that and a lot of concern. 

I understand, from what I can hear from the cautious and carefully-worded statements of the 
gentlemen before us here today, that you share that concern. If that's so, we're going to have a 
real problem. We're not going to be able to go that way if it undermines the safety and security of 
this country. And I know the ranking member said that adequacy of deterrence is a matter for 
civilians, that types of targets is a policy question. I guess that means for politicians. The 
percentage of targets needed to deter an adversary is a policy question. But I think we need your 
opinions on that. 

I've got a lot of issues. I came here, like everybody else did, from different backgrounds. We've 
got demands on us. I saw my March of Dimes people in the hall a while ago. They want to talk 
about health care issues. But I've got to talk to some people whose life is given to the safety and 
security of this nation. 

And we appreciate your willingness to share your concerns with us. And as I understand what so 
far has been said is that this group does not endorse going as low as has been published in the 
paper we may be considering going; that is, in the 1,500 range. And it strikes me that that would 
be unwise. We might as well get that out on the table to begin with. 

I did want to ask about -- Admiral Mies, you indicated that we should ask ourselves, would these 
further reductions enhance our security? And I think that's a fundamental question for us today. 
What are some of your concerns if we were to go down -- and when we're talking about 1,500, 
are we talking about launchers now or weapons? 

ADM. MIES: I would assume that any numbers being discussed in the recent Russian proposals 
would basically be within the START framework, and therefore the attribution and counting 
rules that apply in general within START would affect launchers, not exact numbers of 
warheads. 

SEN. SESSIONS: Would you share with us your concerns, maybe without even using -- well, if 
you would give us some numbers; but if not, just generally what could happen if we get too low 
on those numbers. How is our security impacted? 

ADM. MIES: Well, as I've tried to indicate in my earlier testimony, as you come lower with an 
existing strategy, essentially it disconnects your ability to execute the strategy as you come lower 
and lower in your forces. Certainly there's a concern in the symmetry in our stockpiles and with 
stockpile transparency in general, because again, in general, you're only reducing your strategic 
launchers. You're not directly affecting the non-strategic or the tactical nuclear weapon 
inventories of either side. And to a certain degree, you're not addressing some of the concerns 
associated with production capacities and other asymmetries as well. So there's an asymmetry 
issue in the larger stockpiles that's an area of concern. 

Ultimately, it's not an issue of numbers. It's an issue of stability. What is your strategy, and how 
do you implement that strategy in a way that you are comfortable or confident that you can deter 
potential adversaries? 

SEN. SESSIONS: But it is numbers. If it were 10, that wouldn't be enough. I mean, a number 
does make a difference. 

ADM. MIES: Certainly numbers make a difference, but numbers also influence your options 
with respect to what kind of strategy you may have to adopt. The strategy you'll adopt at 10 will 
be far, far different than the strategy you would adopt at 6,000, I think. 

SEN. SESSIONS: Well, I guess the agreement -- we're talking about numbers in this treaty, so 
we're talking about numbers. Everybody's talking about numbers. And at some point, numbers 
do make a difference. Let me ask you one more question. Are you confident in our ability to 
identify all potential safety and reliability problems in all weapons expected to be included in the 
enduring nuclear stockpile? How might any uncertainties in the annual nuclear warhead 
certification impact your ability to carry out your mission, General Mies? 

ADM. MIES: I'm confident that we have a robust stockpile surveillance program which is 
designed to really detect, as best we can, problems associated with the stockpile. And we also 
have a robust surveillance program with our delivery systems as well, because the ultimate 
weapon system reliability is not just a function of warhead reliability, but it's really a function of 
the integrated system in its total performance. 

I'm comfortable we have a robust surveillance system in place. But at the same time, if you look 
at the history of the stockpile, if you look at the history of our systems, we have always had 
surprises. And I think it would be naive for us to not anticipate we won't have future surprises in 
that regard. 

SEN. SESSIONS: So margin for error is necessary, in your opinion. 

ADM. MIES: Certainly your margins as you go to lower numbers is a consideration in your 
analysis with respect to stability or operational flexibility in being able to deal with unanticipated 
events. And I think that's a prime consideration. And I don't think there's any disagreement 
within OSD or DOD on this issue. The importance of a strong, robust surveillance program is 
critical. 

SEN. SESSIONS: Mr. Chairman, thank you for -- Mr. Chairman, I just would add that I believe 
we have a unique role in the world today, and I don't think that that role requires us to abdicate 
our leadership. It does not require us to eliminate the lead we may have in nuclear weaponry or 
any other defense capability. 

I think it would be a colossal error of historic proportions if we just unilaterally, because friends 
and people, nations we want to be friends with, ask us to abolish our lead, that we just do so. 
That does not make sense and is not what a great nation ought to do. We've got a history of 
leading the world in a positive direction. The world will not be better off if the United States is 
on a par with many other nations in nuclear weaponry, in my view. And so we want to maintain 
this continual reduction in forces as much as we can. I understand our military people agree. But 
there is a limit to how low we can go, and thank you for leading this inquiry. 

SEN. WARNER: I thank the gentleman from Alabama. Now, Senator Reed, you and Senator 
Cleland are the wrap-up hitters here before we go into a closed session. 

SEN. JACK REED (D-RI): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I've got several questions I'd 
like to ask the closed session, but let me ask a very basic question first to Admiral Mies. Admiral 
Mies, we've been talking a lot about numbers. Could you just explain how we count things and 
also the alternative ways we could approach counting? And I presume these are being considered 
as part of the discussions for the upcoming summit. Confirm that presumption, if you would. 

ADM. MIES: Basically, the START framework has a series of attribution and counting rules 
such that for a given weapon system, that weapon system is attributed to deliver or carry a 
certain number of nuclear warheads. And therefore, every one of those delivery systems, whether 
it's a Trident submarine or a B-52 bomber or a Minuteman ICBM, is attributed, whether it really 
carries or not, that number of warheads. And there is a certain inspection and verification regime 
that exists to periodically check each other's side to ensure that we are, in a sense, being truthful 
in that regard. So it's a framework that consists of launcher accountability. 

SEN. REED: So this fixation with certain numbers -- we've talked about 2,500, 2,000, 1,500 -- in 
some respects (precedes?) the notion of the framework that's out there. We could change the 
framework, change the numbers we're looking at, and still, in your view, achieve the kind of 
strategic security that you are tasked for in your role as head of Strategic Command. 

ADM. MIES: Certainly, as I think we come lower and lower, ultimately we are obliged to 
change the framework. We will not have a choice, because the constraints of the counting rules 
and the attribution rules at some point in time start to break down and lead you to choices that 
are not necessarily in the national interest. And that's why earlier I said you would need some 
degree of counting rule or attribution rule relief. 

SEN. REED: But that is, I presume -- perhaps we've misspoken here. That presumably is part 
and parcel of these discussions, that this is not a situation where we're simply looking at numbers 
as described by the stockpile, but we're also looking at the framework. I may be right or wrong. 

ADM. MIES: Certainly within the existing Helsinki framework, a certain amount of discussion 
about how those rules could or possibly should be modified, but certainly living within the 
existing framework that was agreed. I think the issue, as you think about further reductions 
below that, requires a more comprehensive look. But because we have been dealing primarily, as 
Secretary Slocombe said, with the Helsinki accord, there has not been a great deal of discussion 
about a different framework. And it would be very, very -- I think a much more lengthy process 
to look at a different framework. 

SEN. REED: Mr. Slocombe, would you like to comment? 

MR. SLOCOMBE: That's exactly right. The problem is, for example, in the area of conventional 
bombers -- and the chief of staff of the Air Force should certainly address this -- we need a long-
range conventional bomber force of a certain size. That's going to be B- 52s. It will include B-
52s. How you deal with the fact that some of the B-52s will have a nuclear mission and some 
will have a conventional mission is exactly the kind of issue which has to be addressed. 

There are elaborate rules in the existing agreements about how to do these attributions, how to do 
the downloading; as Admiral Mies says, how to verify those numbers. Those issues are the kind 
of nitty-gritty detail that will have to be addressed -- indeed, will to some degree have to be 
addressed even in START III, and would certainly have to be addressed if there was any 
consideration of going lower. 

SEN. REED: Thank you. Just a final general question, and that is that sometimes we get also 
fixated on sort of one side of the equation. There's two sides to the equation; that is, essentially 
what the Russians would give up. And your strategy, your missile count, your security, is a 
function of what they give up and what we are sure they cannot replace. And I wonder if you 
might, Mr. Slocombe and Admiral Mies, comment on the fact that part of any end game is not 
just what we're conceding, what number we arrive at; it's looking across the table, if you will, 
where they're at so you can feel sure we are secure. Mr. Slocombe? 

MR. SLOCOMBE: It's certainly true that various people have made the point that you have to do 
a dynamic analysis in a number of senses, and one of them is you have to look at the impact on 
the other side's forces of different arrangements. 

SEN. REED: Admiral Mies, why don't you to comment from a tactical position, a military 
position? 

ADM. MIES: I certainly agree. We certainly would give strong consideration to that. But again, 
our forces are not just designed to deter the Russian forces. And so you have to take into 
consideration the broader issue of how do you deter a number of forces in a multipolar world of 
diverse and unpredictable threats, to a certain degree, in a bilateral treaty framework with Russia. 

SEN. REED: Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

SEN. WARNER: Thank you. Senator Cleland. 

SEN. MAX CLELAND (D-GA): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I'm sitting here thinking 
about -- by the way, thank you very much for your service, and thank you for helping us tackle 
this difficult issue. I'm sitting here thinking about General Powell's point to me once when he 
was chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that we must use the American military to stay out of 
war, but if we get in a war, win and win quickly. 

I think that's a point we ought to consider, that first -- (inaudible). Therein comes the concept of 
deterrence. And how much is enough? How many warheads are enough? But I wonder if, instead 
of warheads, we shouldn't be thinking about detonations. Detonations equal destruction. And I 
think that's what we're talking about here, not just numbers of ships or planes or missiles, but 
amount of destructive capability to deter. And deterrence then equals security. So how many 
detonations and how much destructive power do we have to deter a strike on us so that that 
enhances our security? 

I think those numbers shift, quite frankly. I think it was one thing in 1945, certainly was another 
thing in the '50s and '60s. Certainly with the technology we have now, it's another number. I 
think this shifts all the time. I understand that we have the destructive power, if we unleashed an 
attack on the Russians and the Russians released an attack on us, we have a combined destructive 
capacity to unleash, within 30 minutes on each other, 100,000 Hiroshima bombs, in effect. 

So the destructive power here has dramatically increased. I understand one missile out of one 
Trident submarine -- the Trident submarines are based in Georgia at Kings Bay -- carries enough 
destructive power equivalent to all the bombs dropped in Western Europe in World War II. So I 
would hate for us to get wrapped around an axle here with just sheer numbers, and I'd like to 
move the discussion to destructive power and look at the concept of deterrence and see if we 
aren't really talking about not deterring war but ensuring survival. 

It does seem now, with the end of the Cold War, that a new strategy has emerged, primarily put 
forward by the man who occupied my Senate seat, Sam Nunn, working with Senator Lugar, and 
that is cooperative threat reduction. That gets us into the whole strategic arms reduction treaties 
and a sense that our security is enhanced if we reduce cooperatively the destructive power that 
our mutual nations can inflict upon one another. I think that's what gets us into this debate. 

I wonder if we are going down the path of cooperative threat reduction, a la Nunn-Lugar, and 
helping the Russians to build down their nuclear capacity, which we apparently see as in our 
interest, that they reduce their warheads, and whether we help them with monies to secure their 
warheads that they even have today, that our security is actually enhanced by their reduction. 
They seem to see that their security is enhanced by their reduction. The Duma just adopted 
START II with certain restrictions. They would like to go even further, because they see it in 
their security interest. And maybe we should see it in ours. 

So it seems to me that we are moving in the right direction -- cooperative threat reduction, a la 
Nunn-Lugar. But I am surprised that the number of targets in the nuclear war plan have increased 
by 20 percent. So I think we're a little schizophrenic here. I just wonder, Mr. Secretary, if you'd 
like to take a crack at this. 

We are moving in the area of arms reduction, because it seems to me this nation and the Russians 
seem to feel it's in our interest as nations and will enhance our security if this balance of nuclear 
terror is actually reduced in the number of warheads, which is destructive power. Are we 
pursuing that, or are we actually increasing the number of targets in the nuclear war plan? 

MR. SLOCOMBE: I'd like to discuss the issue of the number of targets in classified session, 
because it is obviously a very sensitive issue. But there is no question that it is the objective of 
this administration, as I think it has been the objective of administrations for years and years 
going back, as I said, at least to the '60s, that to reduce the burdens, the scale an the risks of 
nuclear war. As Admiral Mies has said, and absolutely rightly, that is not simply a question of 
how many nuclear weapons exist; it has a lot to do with the characteristics of those nuclear 
weapons. You have to take into account a number of factors. But I want to particularly comment 
on what you said at the beginning. 

It is very important to remember that we are talking about weapons of immense destructive 
power. This is -- the -- I can't -- I've tried to do it in my head -- I can't do it in my head the 
calculation you have obviously done about how many Hiroshimas, but they are weapons of 
immense destructive power, and the world will be a better place if we continue to find ways to 
control that threat. 

I also think it's very important -- you made the point about cooperative threat reduction with 
Russia. The relationship with Russia now is fundamental -- for all the problems that we have 
with them and they have with us -- is fundamentally different from the relationship we had with 
the Soviet Union. And I think all of us would agree that much of what we are talking about is 
hedging against an event which we think is quite remote. We have to hedge against it. But the 
course that we want to follow is a cooperative course with Russia. The Russians when they talk 
about this talk about it in exactly the same turns, that we both recognize when we are talking 
about a different relationship from the one we have now for all of its problems and the one we 
hope to have in the future. That doesn't make it any less important to do it right. But it's very 
important to keep that in perspective. 

SEN. CLELAND: General Shelton, we built up a massive amount of warheads during the Cold 
War, as did the Russians. We are in a different relationship with them now. Do you see it in our 
strategic national security interests to work with the Russians cooperatively and jointly bit by bit, 
slowly, maybe inch by inch, to reduce the balance of nuclear terror by reducing the number of 
warheads, by reducing the amount of destruction we could levy on one another? 

GEN. SHELTON: Senator Cleland, first I think you will find that all of us in the Joint Chiefs are 
supportive of the cooperative threat reduction plan, Nunn-Lugar, and that we feel like this 
program should be supported, and we need to continue to work those issues. 

As you said, when you look at our strategic deterrence, it is more than sheer numbers, and those 
numbers tie back into what our strategy is. And so at some point as you come down in the 
numbers you need a very thorough review and a thorough analysis to underpin that to ensure that 
the -- in an issue this important to our nation that our numbers that we anticipate reducing can 
still meet what our strategy is and still ensure the survivability of our nation, and therefore 
enhance our security posture versus just reducing the numbers and creating therefore greater 
uncertainty in terms of our survivability. 

SEN. CLELAND: Thank you. Do you think that with the other kind of potential threats, the so-
called rogue nations, the bad actors, whatever, obviously they don't have 6,000 nuclear warheads 
like the Russians. They obviously may not have but one or two. Does the strategy of deterrence 
apply to that kind of threat, or are we just in another ballgame there? 

GEN. SHELTON: I think, Senator Cleland, that to some degree with the types of nations that we 
have commonly referred to as "rogue nations" that may possess just a minimum capability, 
deterrence I think is still very important. I think that they understand that these types of systems 
have a signature -- they have a return address associated with them. And so we immediately 
know where it is coming from, and therefore could take the actions that have been discussed here 
this morning, if the president, if our nation elected to do that. I think that is a powerful signal to 
them. 

I do think that there is another issue associated with this that deals with how they might elect to 
come at us, and if they elected to use that one or two that they had, whether or not we were able 
to defend ourselves against that of course is part of the ongoing debate which we think is 
appropriate. 

SEN. CLELAND: And, Mr. Chairman, one final question. Am I correct in understanding that the 
Joint Chiefs have not yet concluded your analysis of how much is enough so to speak in terms of 
the nuclear strategy of deterrence? Is that correct? 

GEN. SHELTON: Senator Cleland, we are comfortable with the strategy the United States has 
right now, and our ability to carry out that strategy within the Helsinki framework. If we want to 
depart from that, we would not feel comfortable short of a comprehensive review of the strategy. 

SEN. CLELAND: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

SEN. WARNER: Thank you, Senator Cleland. I always enjoy following your question-and-
answer colloquy with our witnesses, and I must say I would like to make an observation drawn 
on some quarter of a century plus involved in this issue. 

Secretary Slocombe, I hope when we go to the summit and the question of the national missile 
defense, the limited structure that is in law for rogue attacks, unintentional and the like -- when 
that discussion takes place that the president makes reference to sort of the unwritten but 
nevertheless basic philosophy of all presidents since Lyndon Johnson, and that is -- and I 
expressed this privately to the so to speak my counterpart in the Russian Duma when he visited 
here last week. And that is in all of these calculations and formulations with the Soviet Union 
and indeed now with Russia, there is an underlying concept that there will be in -- then in the 
Soviet Union and now in Russia -- a rational framework of decision-makers before any trigger is 
pulled. That is not the case with these rogue nations that we face around the world. That is not 
the case. Indeed, in sum, irrationality has been the hallmark. And that's why it is so urgent for us 
to address this national missile defense system of a limited capability. 

Lastly, I think that we didn't cover fully -- I think Senator Smith worked on it very hard -- this 
tactical thing. But we have got to go back in history. It was President Bush who made the 
decision to unilaterally eliminate most of our tactical nuclear weapons, and they ranged from 
artillery, nuclear tactical missiles, sea-based tactical nuclear weapons, except the sea-launched 
cruise -- this was all taken out of our inventory. And in sharp contrast, the Russians have retain 
theirs to the point where we dropped from 10,000 down to maybe 1,500 in inventory basically 
here in the continental limits of the United States. They still have upwards of 10 or 12 thousand 
of these weapons. So the question is: Should we seek to address this issue of tactical nuclear 
weapons and any framework under START III? I think you have answered that in the 
affirmative, have you not, Admiral Mies? 

ADM. MIES: Yes, sir. And I think there are some initiatives in the current Helsinki framework 
that are attempts to honestly start to address that issue, because historically they have not been 
fully addressed. But -- 

SEN. WARNER: Well, I think that's a tremendous disparity. 

Secretary Slocombe, out of fairness, you have heard the proceedings today -- we thank the 
president, the secretary and yourself for letting us have this very important panel. Any wrap-up 
comments you wish to make before we go into -- Thank you very much, we'll adjourn the open 
session and immediately convene the closed in S. 407. (Sounds gavel.) And we'll put in Senator 
Allard's statement in the record of today. Thank you very much. 

END 

LANGUAGE: ENGLISH 

LOAD-DATE: May 24, 2000 

 
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