Nuclear Arms Reduction: The Process and Problems. Edited by A.S.Diakov,
published by the Center for Arms Control, Energy
and Environmental Studies at the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology,
Dolgoprudny, October, 1997 - 59 pages.
Published in English in June, 1998
This report has been prepared at the Center
for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies at the Moscow Institute
of Physics and Technology. One of the Center's programs supported by W.
Alton Jones Foundation is focused on the analysis and development of
alternative approaches to strategic weapons reductions by Russia and the
United States. In its research, the Center consults with experts from the
Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defense and Atomic Energy, as well as from
the academia and non-governmental organizations.
Authors of this report are:
Vladimir Semenovich Belous, Major General (retired), Professor of
the Academy of Military Sciences, Head of the Military Policy Sector of
the Center for Academic Research of Committee of Scientists for Global
Security.
Anatoli Stepanovich Diakov, Director of the Center for Arms Control,
Energy and Environmental Studies, Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology.
Timur Tairovich Kadyshev, Yevgeny Vladimirovich Miasnikov and Pavel
Leonardovich Podvig are research fellows at the Center.
The authors thank Rear Admiral Aleksey Mikhailovich Ovcharenko,
the deputy chief of Operational Directorate of the Main Naval Staff, and
Oleg Nikolayevich Shagov, the Senior Adviser of the Security and
Disarmament Department of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for
consultations during the writing of this paper.
Contacting information:
Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies
Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology
Institutski Pereulok, 9
Dolgoprudny, Moscow Reg. 141700
Tel.: 7-095-408 6381
Fax: 7-095-408 4477
e-mail: center@iris.mipt.ru
http://www.armscontrol.ru/
http://blue.iris.mipt.ru/
Responses
Review of the Center's report,
(in Russian) published in a supplement to Nezavisimaya
Gazeta NG-Scenarii (December 9, 1997, p.8)
Response from Colonel-General
Yakovlev, CinC of the Strategic Missile Forces (in Russian)
Responce from Admiral
Kuroyedov, CinC of the Russian Navy (in Russian)
Table of Contents
Abbreviations
Introduction
Chapter 1. Trends in Nuclear Disarmament. The Drawbacks
of the START I and START II Treaties
Chapter 2. The Role of Nuclear Weapons in the Russian
Federation's Policy
Chapter 3. The Russian Federation's Strategic Nuclear
Forces: Present Status and Prospective Developments
Chapter 4. Further Reduction of Russian and U.S. Strategic
Nuclear Forces
Conclusion
Abbreviations
ALCM Air-Launched Cruise Missiles
ABM Anti-Ballistic Missile
ABM Treaty Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty
CFE Treaty Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty
CTBT Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GNP Gross National Product
ICBM Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
INF Treaty Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty
MIRV Multiple Independently targetable Re-entry Vehicle
MIRVed equipped with MIRV
NPT Non-Proliferation Treaty
SLBM Sea-Launched Ballistic Missiles
SLCM Sea-Launched Cruise Missiles
SNF Strategic Nuclear Forces
SSBN nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine
START I, II Strategic Arms Reductions Treaties
Introduction
After the end of the Cold War, Russia and the United States made substantial
progress in reducing their nuclear arsenals. However, problems that arose
in the course of preparation for the ratification of the START II Treaty
by the Russian Federal Assembly created serious obstacles for this process.
It would be mistaken to think that these difficulties are created exclusively
by the State Duma. The Treaty is heavily criticized by the majority of
Russian experts who enumerate a number of shortcomings which, in their
opinion, not only give the United States a considerable advantage in carrying
out strategic nuclear weapons reduction but lead to the violation of the
principle of equitable security.
The United States' striving for unilateral advantages in strategic weapons
reduction is quite explicable. The United States would like to safeguard
itself from possible unfavorable (as the U.S. sees it) development of events
in Russia. Because of sophisticated use of the tactic for decision-making
on a political level during START II negotiations the United States was
able to get the Treaty with considerable benefits. However, the Clinton
administration apparently realizes that in order to guarantee the Treaty's
ratification by the State Duma, the U.S. will have to agree to a number
of steps that could enhance the prospects for Russian ratification. This
was manifested in the Helsinki Agreement and the Protocol to the START
II Treaty signed on 26 September 1997. These documents extend the START
II implementation time-frame from 1 January 2003 to 31 December 2007, and
also tie the beginning of negotiations on the next phase of reductions
to START II's ratification by Russia.
At the same time, the criticism of START II does not mean that Russian
society objects to further steps in nuclear disarmament. The idea of reducing
of nuclear strategic weapons inventories is very popular in Russia. There
is an understanding that in the framework of START III it would be desirable
to reach the levels even lower than has been agreed to in Helsinki, as
well as keep out both the possibility of unilateral advantages and circumvention
of mutual agreements.
This report presents an analysis of the state of strategic nuclear weapons
reduction process, considers the role of nuclear weapons in Russian policy
and the ability of the Russian military-industrial complex to maintain
strategic nuclear weapons. The analysis is followed by the conditions and
parameters for the next phase of strategic weapons reductions whose discussion
and agreement with the United States could precede the ratification of
START II.
Conclusion
-
Despite the post-Cold-War improvements in international climate, nuclear
weapons remain an important instrument of foreign policy. They cannot be
annulled by a declaration, and conditions for their presence in the world
will quite likely endure for more than one decade. Nevertheless, Russian
and U.S. nuclear arsenals are excessive even in the framework of the proclaimed
deterrence strategies. Further joint reduction of deployed strategic offensive
forces would allow to lessen the economic burden on both countries, to
lower significantly the risk of an unauthorized or accidental use of nuclear
weapons, and their proliferation. Following the path of nuclear arsenals'
reduction would strengthen confidence between the leading nuclear powers
and demonstrate to the world their desire for the complete elimination
of nuclear weapons.
-
Nuclear superpowers could make an important step toward lowering the role
of nuclear weapons in global politics and in strategic stability by adopting
a concept of non-confrontational nuclear deterrence. The new concept should
exclude provocative elements of the Cold War era. Nuclear weapons should
be regarded as extreme means of a nation's protection against the threat
of destruction. When shaping a new configuration of its SNF Russia should
put an emphasis on guaranteeing their survivability under any wartime conditions,
maintaining key elements of the strategic forces as well as the industrial
and scientific infrastructure.
-
Ratification of the START II Treaty by the Russian parliament is currently
the main obstacle on the way toward further disarmament. Despite all the
Treaty's shortcomings its ratification and implementation are in Russia's
interests.
-
Russia's obligations under START II should be linked to a new U.S.-Russian
agreement on the next stage of strategic offensive forces' reduction. We
believe that at the next stage strategic forces should be reduced to 1,500
warheads on each side by 2008. To prevent START III from sharing the fate
of START II it is vital to correct the imbalance ensuing from the previous
negotiations. This seems possible if the new Treaty incorporates measures
for the elimination of warheads and warhead RV platforms of the eliminated
strategic offensive weapons, limiting the number of deployed SLBM launchers,
guaranteeing the irreversibility of the conversion of heavy bombers, and
other specific proposals for decreasing the breakout potential. It also
seems important to include verifiable measures for eliminating or limiting
nuclear SLCMs and strengthening the transparency regime which could also
encompass production and dismantlement of nuclear weapons.
-
If START III is signed, then prospects for its ratification and implementation
by the Russian side will to a large extent be determined by such factors
as the development in the United States of an ABM system, dynamics and
nature of NATO enlargement, and whether Russian interests are going to
be considered in the process. Russia should also insist on working out
U.S.-Russian agreements relating to limits on the counterforce capability
of conventional high-precision weapons and anti-submarine warfare. This
becomes particularly important because the survivability of strategic offensive
forces will certainly be a decisive factor during the process of further
nuclear reductions.
© Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies
at MIPT, 1998.
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